Abstract
INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurship is one of the "main vehicles" of economic development (Hisrich, Anokhin, & Grichnik, 2008) . Dejardin (2000) asserted that the more entrepreneurs there are in an economy, the faster it will grow. Evidence and experiences in many countries have shown that raising awareness of the importance of entrepreneurial spirits and encouraging start-ups are powerful drivers of sustainable growth. Therefore, promoting entrepreneurship is a strategic priority of many governments, especially in developing Many factors of the business environment have been significantly improved in order to facilitate the development of the private sector such as reducing market entry costs, increasing business support activities or raising labor quality. However, compared to countries of the same level of economic development, the business environment in Vietnam still has many signs of weakness, with 9 out of 12 indicators of business conditions ranking below average (VCCI, 2016a) in which the government support program indicator is reported to have the lowest ranking (50/62).
According to the Dona, Slavica, and Mike (2015) , an ongoing paradox is that along with sharply increased awareness about the existence of business opportunities from 36.8% (2013) and 39.4% (2014) to 56.8%, the rate of adults having entrepreneurial intention has declined gradually and is still lower than average rate in the factor-driven economies. While the rate of adults having entrepreneurial intention reached 22.3%, the rate of business startups in Vietnam only reached 0.6%. So, it can be inferred that there is a limitation from transforming the entrepreneurial intention into a decision to start a business in Vietnam. In addition, the rate of business discontinuance is still at a high level, of 27%, implying that for every 100 entrepreneurs in the Total Early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA), 27 of them have given up their business. Figure 2 provides the comprehensive view of Vietnam entrepreneurial activities in 2015. The objective of this study is to determine what institutional factors affect entrepreneurship development in Vietnam. This is necessary for providing recommendations to promote entrepreneurship and innovation to develop the economy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the objective of the study. Section 2 provides a literature review on institutions and entrepreneurship and formulates a set of hypotheses. Data and variables used in the analysis are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the regression results while Section 5 offers concluding remarks and policy implications.
INSTITUTIONS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP
The rate of entrepreneurial activity depends not only on the capability of individuals, but also on the institutional factors which create favorable conditions or cause barriers to entrepreneurship (Fogel, Hawk, Morck, & Yeung, 2009) . Institutional barriers were first emphasized by Baumol (1990) and developed by other economists including Sobel (2008) . These barriers include the lack of law enforcement, administrative barriers to entering the market, property rights, informal payments, and lack of governmental support. A good institutional environment creates favorable conditions for individuals to enter the market and expand their business. Zhou (2011) , for instance, reported that regional deregulation in China has increased the net private sector's growth rate. In contrast, a weak institutional environment that does not protect property rights lacks supporting programs or increases harassment by local governments generating high transaction costs and low potential profits. Consequently, more and more entrepreneurs decide to exit the market. With this institutional framework in mind, this paper formulates the following hypotheses:
• H1: The better the quality of the institution is, the higher the number of nonstate enterprises in the economy is.
• H2: The better the quality of the institution is, the higher the number of nonfarm individual establishments in the economy is.
Institutions in transition economies not only increase the number of private enterprises and the individual establishments but also the size of the private sector that is shown by the number of workers in private companies (Zhou, 2011 (Tenev et al., 2003) . Thus, the next two hypotheses are formulated as follows:
• H3: The better the quality of the institution is, the more employment in the non-state enterprise of the economy is.
• H4: The better the quality of the institution is, the more employment in individual establishments of the economy is. by the private sector. The higher the share of labor force working in the private sector is, the higher entrepreneurial spirit the region reflects (Enrico & Tran, 2011) .
Good institutions promote business development through expanding and innovating the production process and creating more jobs in the economy. Hence, in this metrics indicate the number of non-state enterprises and the number of employees working in this sector per 1,000 people in the working-age population in Vietnam. As these measures are not normally distributed, the logarithmic form is used to limit skewness. PCI includes many of the best indicators and is often used to measure the quality of Vietnam's economic institutions (Phạm & Nguyễn, 2015; Phạm & Châu, 2015; Malesky & Taussig, 2009) . PCI consists of ten governance sub-indexes that reflect the private sector's development. However, the indicator "competition environment and state-owned enterprise bias" was replaced by "equal competition" in 2013 and onwards, thus, it is excluded from measuring institutional quality in this paper. Therefore, there are nine sub-indexes of governance 2 † as follows:
Independent variables
• Entry costs: The time it takes a firm to register, the time to receive all the necessary licenses needed to start a business, the number of licenses required to operate a business, and the perceived degree of difficulty to obtain all licenses/permit.
• Land access and security of tenure: Including two dimensions of the land problem confronting entrepreneurs and the level of ease to access land and security of tenure once the land is confiscated.
• Transparency and access to information: Indicating whether firms have access to the proper planning and legal documents necessary to run their business, whether those documents are equitably available, whether new policies and law are communicated to firms and predictably implemented, and the business utility of the provincial web page.
• Time cost of regulatory compliance: The time firms waste on bureaucratic compliance after registration, as well as the frequency of firms' operation prorogation for inspections by local regulatory agencies.
• Informal charges: How much firms pay in informal charge, how much of an obstacle those extra fees pose for their business operations, whether the payment of those extra fees results in expected results or "services", and whether provincial officials use compliance with local regulations to extract rents.
• Proactivity of provincial leadership: Indicator of the dynamism and creativity of provincial government in implementing central policies, designing their own initiatives for private sector development, and working within sometimes unclear national regulatory frameworks to assist and interpret in favor of local private firms.
• Business development services: Provincial services for private sector trade promotion, provision of regulatory information to firms, business partner matchmaking, provision of industrial zones or industrial clusters, and technological services for firms.
• Labor and training: The efforts by provincial authorities to promote vocational training and skill development for local industries and to assist in the placement of local labor with provincial businesses.
• Confidence in legal institutions: The private sector's confidence in provincial legal institutions; whether firms regard provincial institutions as an effective vehicle for dispute resolution or as an avenue for lodging appeals against the corrupt official behavior.
All sub-indexes are scaled from 1 to 10 with a higher score indicating better institutional performance. Malesky and Taussig (2009) show that PCI sub-indexes are all positively correlated and thus they effectively express the same thing. Therefore, the Principal Component Analysis method is used to reduce data sets by transforming the original set of variables to a new set of uncorrelated variables called principal components. The objective is to explain the variance of the observed data through several linear combinations of the original data (Nardo et al., 2008) .
The Kaiser Meyer Olkin (KMO) index of 0.675 implies that using factor analysis is appropriate for the PCI indicators. Furthermore, the PCI sub-indexes correlation is confirmed by the Bartlett's test with a significance level of α < 0.05 and thus the decision to use Principal Component Analysis (PCI) is reinforced in this study. Accordingly, the nine PCI sub-indexes were grouped into three factors responsible for about 68.6 % of the variance between sub-indexes. The first factor (PCIF1) contains five PCI sub-indexes:
Transparency; Time costs; Business support services; Labor training; and Legal institutions that concerned with local policy initiatives or decisions to select and implement those policies (Malesky & Taussig, 2009 ). Therefore, the first factor is called the Policy Factor.
The second factor (PCIF2) has two sub-indexes of entry cost and land access.
They represent the necessary resources and procedures that entrepreneurs must have to enter the market. Access and stability in land use affect not only the new establishments but also the termination of existing businesses in the private sector. These two subindexes are less relevant to policy enforcement but more relevant to formal barriers in the private sector (Malesky & Taussig, 2009) . The second factor is called the Entry Barriers.
And the third factor (PCIF3) contains two sub-indexes with lower correlation: Informal charge; and Pro-activity of provincial leadership.
The Cronbach's alpha coefficient of the PCIF1, PCIF2, and PCIF3 factors were 0.69; 0.80 and 0.56, respectively. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient is the most common estimation for consistency measurement (Nardo et al., 2008) and reliability of the subindexes in each factor. According to Nardo et al. (2008) , the alpha coefficient of 0.7 is deemed acceptable. Meanwhile, many researchers proposed higher critical values, in the range of 0.75 to 0.8, and others also accepted the lower value of 0.6. Thus, it can be seen that PCIF1 and PCIF2 are more reliable than PCIF3. 
Control variables
GDP
Model specification
The model specification utilized to analyze the impact of institutions on entrepreneurship in Vietnam is given by the following equation: There are missing observations in the measures for entrepreneurial activities in several years. Thus, the final data set is an unbalanced panel. Fixed effects (FE) model is applied to test the hypotheses. It is appropriate because the entrepreneurial activities change within the province as the institutional quality changes over time. It also yields less biased estimate than ordinary least square regression (OLS) and random effects (RE) model because it controls for all factors that are unobserved, having time-constant or very little over time (such as institutional factors). Table 2 . In terms of average employment size, the non-state sector in Vietnam consists largely of small-and medium-sized enterprises with an average of 10 employees, and fewer than 2 employees in each individual business establishment. 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

PCIF2 and entrepreneurial activities
The regression results are presented in Table 3 . PCIF2 factor has a positive impact on all four entrepreneurial variables and it is statistically significant at a level of 1%. This implies that "entry cost" and "land access and stability in land use" are two sub-indexes that contribute an important role in promoting the development of private entrepreneurship in Vietnam. The results are consistent with (Zhou, 2011) In contrast, having unclear land ownership title would negatively impact new entry rates in other countries. Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
According to Zedillo (2004) , the absence of ownership obstructed entrepreneurial spirit in many developing countries. In fact, both private enterprises and individual business establishments must have land and property right protection in order for the business to grow. Therefore, if land access is improved, it would encourage new entry. 
PCIF1, PCIF3, and entrepreneurial activities
PCIF1 and PCIF3 have a positive impact on the labor force of non-state enterprises and it is statistically significant at 5% as reported in Table 3 In addition, individual business establishments in Vietnam are small scale with only 1.7 employees, family members are the source of labor and they are low-skilled workers. Therefore, this is the basis for asserting that the PCIF1 policy factors do not affect the individual business sector.
GDP per capita has a statistically significant impact on all four entrepreneurship variables. GDP per capita is considered to be an important control variable and has a positive impact on entrepreneurial activities (Dreher & Gassebner, 2013) . Dreher and Gassebner (2013) share the same view that GDP per capita increases entrepreneurial activities. In contrast, Ovaska and Sobel (2005) argue that per capita GDP does not have a significant impact on the number of new enterprises. Others suggest that GDP per capita even reduces entrepreneurial activities (Stel & Storey, 2003 , as cited in Dreher & Gassebner, 2013 . Previous studies have shown that per capita GDP has a non-linear impact on entrepreneurship (Martínez, 2005 Moreover, the growth of GDP in the province may create benefits in terms of demand for all firms in the country, not just for those within the province.
CONCLUSION
The private sector in Vietnam began to flourish in 2,000 after the Enterprise Law Secondly, land access and sustainability in land use should be improved. Access to land is a problem for entrepreneurs who have to face the relocation policy to limit pollution in urban areas. While enterprises have difficulty in finding new business premises, land funds in industrial zones are still very large. The main reason is that the land rent in industrial zones/clusters is too high. Therefore, it is necessary to have the policy to encourage and support enterprises to access land in industrial zones. Currently, the draft of Support for Small and Medium Enterprises Law has a specific provision for supporting land rent up to 5 years for enterprises from the date of signing contract. In addition, the compensation policy must also be considered satisfactory in the case of land acquisition by shortening the difference in the provincial land price and market price. It is also necessary to clarify the acquisition plan to help enterprises in finding new business premises.
